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S v LITAKO 2014 SACR 431 (SCA): A CLARIFICATION ON EXTRA CURIAL 
STATEMENTS AND HEARSAY  
S Lutchman* 
1 Introduction 
On 16 April, 2014 the Supreme Court of Appeal handed down judgment in the matter 
of S v Litako.1 The judgment reconsiders the landmark decision of the same court, S 
v Ndhlovu,2 in which the court held that an informal admission made by one accused 
could be admitted against a co-accused even if the accused in court denies making 
the statement and the statement itself is therefore considered to be hearsay. The 
court in Ndhlovu applied section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 3 and found 
that the hearsay extra curial admission could be admitted in the interests of justice.4 
In Litako, however, the court found that section 3 did not overrule an existing common 
law rule, which is that the extra curial statement of an accused (whether an informal 
admission or a confession) cannot be tendered against a co-accused.5 This is because 
section 3 does not expressly overrule this common law rule. Rather, the provision itself 
requests that its application be subject to the common law.6 
The judgment is noteworthy for various reasons. Firstly, its fundamental message is 
that section 3 does not replace the long-held common law rule that the extra curial 
statement of an accused cannot be tendered against a co-accused. This is in keeping 
with the existing treatment of accomplice evidence. This evidence was historically 
approached with caution, as accused persons were known for trying to pass blame 
onto a co-accused.7 Secondly, the judgment highlights the current confusion in the 
                                        
*  Salona Lutchman. LLB (UKZN) LLM(NYU). Attorney and Notary of the High Court of South Africa. 
Lecturer in the Department of Public Law, University of Cape Town, South Africa. Email: 
salona.lutchman@uct.ac.za. 
1  S v Litako 2014 2 SACR 431 (SCA) (hereinafter referred to as "Litako") 
2  S v Ndhlovu 2002 2 SACR 325 (SCA) (hereinafter referred to as "Ndhlovu"). 
3  Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the "LEAA"). 
4  S 3(1)(c) of the LEAA. 
5  Litako para 71. 
6  Litako para 52. 
7  See Litako para 39, quoting the court in the matter of R v Matsitwane 1942 AD 213 (hereinafter 
referred to as "Matsitwane") 218. 
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relationship between statute and common law with regards to informal admissions 
and confessions. The court carefully and decisively addresses this confusion and brings 
much-needed clarity to this area of law. Thirdly, the court employs methods of 
statutory interpretation to re-examine the principle from Ndhlovu and finds that the 
court in that case did not apply its mind correctly in disregarding the common law 
rule. The court undertook a teleological approach to interpretation by infusing the 
meaning of the words with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights8 and 
found that the statute had not overruled the common law rule. In this way, the 
applicable statutory provisions were interpreted through the "prism of the Bill of 
Rights."9 It is argued that this interpretation is not "unduly strained"10 and is 
appropriately used by the court. Finally, the judgment appears to ring true with 
practitioners and has been cited with approval by the attorney's profession.11 
It is useful at this juncture to look at the law regarding the admission of extra curial 
statements in criminal proceedings to determine whether the court was correct in its 
analysis of the common law rule. 
2 The common law rule: is there confusion between statute and 
common law? 
The common law rule is that an accused's extra-curial statement, i.e. a statement 
made out of court, cannot be tendered in court as evidence against a co-accused.12 
The rule has its roots in the English common law13 and is still applicable in England.14 
The development of the law of evidence in South Africa was heavily influenced by 
English law due to its incorporation in the South African colonies from the period 1830 
to 1902.15 Thus, South African case law decided prior to the formation of the Republic 
                                        
8  This is essentially the directive of s 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
9  Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd 2001 
1 SA 545 (CC) (hereinafter referred to as "Hyundai") para 21. 
10  This phrase is taken from the court in Hyundai para 24 above. The court here laid down the 
application of s 39(2) of the Constitution. 
11  Olsen 2014 De Rebus 42. 
12  Litako para 39, where the court refers to the first known reference to the rule in South Africa in 
the Appellate Division matter of Matsitwane. 
13  Litako paras 32-37. 
14  Litako para 37. 
15  See further Van Der Merwe "Sources of South African Law of Evidence" 25. 
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of South Africa on 31 May 1961 accurately reflects the English law of evidence.16 Cases 
decided from 31 May 1961 onwards may deviate from the English law if found to be 
incompatible with constitutional provisions or an established South African rule of 
practice17 or the Supreme Court of Appeal believes that the English decision was 
incorrectly decided.18 In 1942, the Appellate Division affirmatively applied this common 
law rule in South Africa19 and it was consistently applied by our courts until the 
landmark decision in Ndhlovu. 
It is important to note that despite the common law's referring to extra curial 
statements as a collective term reflecting both confessions and informal admissions, 
the Criminal Procedure Act20 as well as the respective common law definitions 
distinguish between them in various ways. A confession is understood to be an 
unequivocal acknowledgement of guilt, made out of court.21 An informal admission is 
a statement made out of court which is adverse to that party's case.22 The rules for 
admissibility for a confession are codified in section 217 of the CPA and the rules for 
admissibility for an informal admission are codified in the same act in section 219A. 
All that is required for an informal admission to be admitted is that it is proved to have 
been voluntarily made. The rules for the admissibility of a confession require that it 
be made voluntarily, in sound and sober senses and without undue influence. It has 
been argued that this is a distinction without difference and that the rules for 
admissibility should be the same, regardless of whether the extra curial statement 
amounts to an admission or a confession.23 Indeed, the constitutionality of such 
distinction was raised in Molimi24 but was left undecided. This issue was raised for the 
first time in the proceedings at the Constitutional Court and as such, the court felt that 
                                        
16  Van Der Merwe "Sources of South African Law of Evidence" 24.  
17  Ex parte Minister of Justice: In re R v Pillay 1945 AD 653. 
18  This is by implication of the decision in Van der Linde v Calitz 1967 2 SA 239 (A) 
19  Matsitwane. 
20  Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the "CPA"). 
21  R v Becker 1929 AD 167 177. 
22  S v Molimi 2008 2 SACR 76 (CC) (hereinafter referred to as "Molimi") para 28. See further 
Schwikkard "Informal Admissions" 305. 
23  See further Schwikkard "Informal Admissions" 327 fn 167, referring to the SALC Project 73. 
24  Molimi paras 48-49. 
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the issue could not be decided, however strong the merits, as the court would then 
be a court of first and final instance.  
A further distinction appears when one looks further into the CPA. Section 219 
explicitly states that a confession made by a person is not admissible against another 
person. A similar explicit provision does not exist with regards to informal admissions. 
Upon a careful reading of section 219A(1) relating to the admissibility of informal 
admissions, the provision requires that a voluntary extra curial admission, which does 
not amount to a confession, made "by any person" shall be admissible "against him." 
Interestingly, this was interpreted by the court in Litako to have the same effect as 
section 219, and indicated to the court that the legislature did not contemplate such 
an admission's being tendered as evidence against anyone else.25  
The court in Ndhlovu, however, did not discuss the common law rule at all. This 
omission affirmed the stance of the trial court that section 3 of the LEAA allowed the 
court to disregard the common law rule.26 This further implies that the court in 
Ndhlovu believed that the legislature did intend to draw a distinction between informal 
admissions and confessions. The court here focused on the application of section 3 
(LEAA) and added valuable content to the underdeveloped jurisprudence in the area.27 
In terms of section 3(4) (LEAA), hearsay evidence is defined to be evidence, whether 
oral or in writing, the probative value of which depends upon the credibility of someone 
other than the person giving such evidence. It is to be excluded unless both parties 
consent to its admission,28 the party upon whose credibility the probative value of the 
hearsay depends later testifies in court29 or if it is in the interests of justice30 to allow 
the evidence to be admitted after giving due consideration to seven cumulatively 
weighed factors.31In its analysis, the court in Ndhlovu decided that where the interests 
                                        
25  Litako para 39. 
26  S v Ndhlovu 2001 1 SACR 85 (W) paras 48-49 (hereinafter referred to as "Ndhlovu trial court". 
27  Schwikkard 2003 SALJ 63. 
28  S 3(1)(a) of the LEAA. 
29  S 3(1)(b) of the LEAA. 
30  S 3(1)(c) of the LEAA. 
31  S 3(1)(c)(i)-(vii) of the LEAA. Such factors are: the nature of the proceedings; the nature of the 
evidence; the purpose for which the evidence is tendered; the probative value of the evidence; 
the reason why the evidence is not given by the person upon whose credibility the probative value 
of such evidence depends; any prejudice to a party which the admission of such evidence might 
entail; and any other factor which in the opinion of the court should be taken into account. 
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of justice, which are constitutionally measured, require the admission of the 
statement, the constitutional right to a fair trial (or indeed any constitutional right) is 
not infringed.32  
It is also important to point out that section 217(1)(b)(ii) (CPA) details that a 
confession is presumed to have been freely and voluntarily made by a person in sound 
and sober senses and without undue influence, if it is reduced to writing by or in the 
presence of a magistrate and if it appears from the document that the confession was 
freely and voluntarily made. This rebuttable presumption can be refuted on a balance 
of probabilities. Seeing as how the party who will usually have the burden of proving 
that the confession was not freely and voluntarily made is the accused person, the 
Constitutional Court in the matter of S v Zuma33 found that the presumption 
undermined the accused's right to remain silent, the right not to be compelled to make 
a confession and the right not to be a compellable witness against oneself.34The right 
to a fair trial encapsulated in section 35(3) of the Constitution was broader than the 
individual rights in the provision, and included a concept of substantive fairness which 
demanded that in criminal trials, the burden of proof was always on the prosecution 
and not the accused.35 Thus section 217(b)(ii) was unconstitutional. This implies that 
for the purposes of section 217(b)(ii), the burden is on the prosecution to prove that 
a confession reduced to writing by or in the presence of a magistrate is freely and 
voluntarily made by a person in sound and sober senses without undue influence. 
Interestingly, a similar presumption in relation to admissions is to be found in section 
219A(1)(b) (CPA). It has been argued that such a provision will not withstand 
constitutional muster based on the same argument as that put forward in Zuma.36 The 
South African Law Commission has recommended that informal admissions and 
confessions be subject to the same requirements for admissibility.37 To date, no 
legislative changes have been made. 
                                        
32  Ndhlovu para 24. 
33  S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642 (CC), hereinafter referred to as "Zuma". 
34  Zuma para 33. 
35  Zuma para 33. For further discussion, see Schwikkard "Confessions in Criminal Trials" 345. 
36  See Schwikkard "Informal Admissions" 331. 
37  SALC Project 73. 
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Which interpretation of the common law and statute is correct? At this point, it is 
important to look at the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Litako. 
3 The Litako decision 
3.1 Facts and the court a quo decision 
The case involved the commission of certain crimes at the White House Tavern in 
Madikwe, North West Province on the night of 4 February 2007. On the night in 
question, the owner of the tavern and one of her patrons were robbed of R5000 and 
their cellular telephones.38 One patron was assaulted and in the violent gun battle 
which ensued, another patron was murdered. Six accused persons were charged in 
the North West High Court with murder, two counts of robbery with aggravating 
circumstances, assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm, four counts of the 
possession of firearms in contravention of section 3 read with sections 1, 103, 117, 
120(1)(a) and Schedule 4 of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, and one count of 
the unlawful possession of ammunition in contravention of section 90 read with 
sections 1, 103, 117, 120(1)(a), 121 and Schedule 4 of the Firearms Control Act. The 
accused persons pleaded not guilty to all the charges. Largely on the basis of a 
statement made by the first accused to a magistrate which implicated his co-accuseds, 
Hendricks J found all six accused persons guilty and they were convicted.  
It is useful to analyse the trial court's assessment of the evidence. The first accused 
denied the truth of the contents of the statement and argued that it had not been 
freely and voluntarily made. In terms of section 219A(1)(CPA), the only requirement 
for the admissibility of an informal admission is that it is freely and voluntarily made. 
However, if such an admission is reduced to writing by or in the presence of a 
magistrate, and if it appears from the document that the admission was freely and 
voluntarily made, it is presumed to be such upon mere production. If an accused 
person wishes to challenge this presumption, he must discharge this burden on a 
balance of probabilities. As pointed out earlier, the constitutionality of this provision is 
in doubt due to the finding of the court in Zuma. Interestingly, this was not alleged 
                                        
38  Litako para 1. 
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by the parties and was thus not determined by the court in Litako. If the court a quo 
or SCA did find that section 219A(1)(CPA) was unconstitutional (and this was then 
confirmed by the Constitutional Court), it would seem likely that no reliance would 
have been placed on the notorious admission and the resultant convictions would not 
have made. 
The prosecution did not provide any reliable, direct evidence implicating the accused 
persons. The eye witness accounts by the tavern owner and a patron were inconsistent 
and unreliable.39 Furthermore, it was admitted by the prosecution that there was no 
acceptable ballistics evidence linking any of the accused persons to the crimes.40 
Essentially, the state's case was hinged on the notorious admission made by the first 
accused.41 
A trial within a trial was conducted in the court a quo to determine the admissibility of 
the statement. Given the wording of section 219A(1)(b)(CPA), the burden of proving 
that the statement had not been freely and voluntarily made rested with the first 
accused.42The first accused led evidence to show that he had been assaulted by the 
police and threatened in order to induce the statement.43 The magistrate who had 
taken the statement from the first accused testified that he had been meticulous in 
ensuring that the statement was made freely and voluntarily. He informed the first 
accused of his constitutional rights and enquired whether he had been assaulted or in 
any other way influenced to make a statement.44 Hendricks J rejected the evidence of 
the first accused and held the statement to be admissible.45 The statement was held 
to be admissible against his co-accuseds on the basis of section 3 (LEAA).46 The trial 
court used the decisions in Ndhlovu and Molimi as authority for admitting the 
statement made by the first accused. The court reasoned that if the interests of justice 
                                        
39  Litako paras 8, 9, 11, 13. 
40  Litako para 22. 
41  Litako para 23. 
42  The author has been unable to obtain a copy of the judgment of the court a quo in Litako. A 
discussion on the decision of that court is thus limited to the comments made by the SCA in Litako. 
43  Litako para 25. 
44  Litako para 24. 
45  Litako para 26. 
46  Litako para 26. 
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require the admission of the hearsay evidence, the right of the accused person to 
challenge the admissibility of the evidence does not include the right to cross 
examine.47 Despite testifying at the trial within a trial to determine the admissibility of 
the statement, the first accused did not testify with regards to the merit of the 
charges.48 The court held this failure to testify against him and rejected the evidence 
of the other accused persons that they had not been involved in the incident.49 On the 
basis of the extra curial statement, the trial judge found that the eye witness accounts 
were corroborated and the firearms found in the possession of the second and fourth 
accuseds could be positively linked to the robbery.50 By applying the doctrine of 
common purpose, the court concluded that the accuseds had acted in concert in 
perpetrating the offences.51 
The matter was then sent on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal. A discussion of 
that decision follows. 
3.2 The SCA decision and analysis 
3.2.1 The reasoning of court and an analysis 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) was written by judges Navsa and 
Ponnan, with judges Leach, Petse and Swain concurring. The court approached the 
matter from three discussion points. Firstly, the court discussed the development of 
the law in relation to the admissibility of extra curial statements made by an accused 
and tendered against a co-accused. Secondly, the judgment closely examined and 
scrutinised the decision in Ndhlovu. Thirdly, the court decided whether the convictions 
in the matter were well founded. 
With regard to the first issue, the court carefully chronicled the development of the 
common law rule and the treatment of confessions and informal admissions in the 
                                        
47  Litako para 29. 
48  Litako para 4. 
49  Litako para 30. 
50  Litako para 28. 
51  Litako para 30.  
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common law. By referring to R v George Cecil Rhodes52, the court found an early 
English source for the rule that an extra curial admission made by an accused cannot 
be tendered against a co-accused.53 This English case, decided before the 31 May 
1961, is part of South African common law and is binding. The court then looked at 
the case of R v Spinks54, decided after 31 May 1961 and found the dictum instructive. 
However, reference to this case is at best persuasive since the case was decided after 
31 May 1961 and is considered to be foreign law. Be that as it may, the Rhodes 
decision is instructive and as stated earlier can be overruled only if the Supreme Court 
of Appeal believes that it was incorrectly decided, is deemed to be unconstitutional, 
or is contrary to an established rule of practice in South African courts. The common 
law rule has in fact been consistently applied by our courts.55 
The court then briefly analysed the applicable provisions of the CPA.56 On its 
interpretation of section 219A, an informal admission made voluntarily is admissible 
only against its maker. Thus the court deduced that the legislature did not intend that 
such an admission could be tendered against anyone else. To its mind, this 
interpretation is linked to and is similar to the prohibition on the use of confessions 
against another found in section 219.57 The court does not delve further in its 
assessment to determine the implication, if any, for the legislative omission of a similar 
explicit prohibition applicable to informal admissions. 
With regards to the second issue, the court drew attention to the fact that the Ndhlovu 
judgment did not refer to the common law rule at all. On a technical point, the court 
made special mention of the facts of Ndhlovu in order to deduce that the nature of 
the hearsay statements in that case could have been interpreted to be confessions.58 
However, the statements were tendered as admissions and as such, the trial court 
found that there was no statutory bar to the use of the statements against a co-
                                        
52  R v George Cecil Rhodes 1960 44 Cr App Rep 23, 28 (hereinafter referred to as "Rhodes"). 
53  Litako para 34. 
54  R v Spinks 1982 1 All ER 587 (CA). 
55  Litako paras 39-42. The court traces this back to the case of Matsitwane.  
56  Litako para 38. 
57  Litako paras 38, 54 above. 
58  Litako para 49 above. 
S LUTCHMAN   PER / PELJ 2015(18)2 
 
 
439 
accused.59 Hence, section 3 of the LEAA could be invoked and the common law rule 
could be disregarded.60 On appeal, the court in Ndhlovu did not even consider the 
common law rule, thereby implying its acceptance of the trial court's reasoning. The 
court here was focused on the enquiry submitted i.e. whether section 3 was 
constitutional in the light of the accused's right to adduce and challenge evidence, 
rather than the applicability of the common law rule. This oversight by the trial and 
appeal court in Ndhlovu is criticised in Litako for not taking due consideration of the 
inherent dangers in the admission of hearsay evidence, especially in relation to the 
use of extra curial statements made by one accused against a co-accused.61 
The court further expressed the opinion that on a jurisprudential level, admissions and 
confessions should be treated the same in the law. The effect of the use of an extra 
curial statement tendered against a co-accused could either be tangential or 
devastating, and depended on the court's categorisation of the statement as an 
admission or a confession.62 For instance, a true calamity might result if the trial court 
decided that the statement was an admission and on appeal it was found to be a 
confession. That might result in the accused's being asked questions about 
inadmissible evidence, infringing his right to a fair trial.63On that note, the court 
affirmed the minority opinion in Balkwell v S, and found that the admission of an extra 
curial statement of an accused against a co-accused infringed the right to a fair trial, 
as the co-accused in such an instance would have to engage in legal battle "without 
the sword of cross-examination or the shield of the cautionary rules of evidence."64 In 
this instance, an extra curial statement admitted as hearsay in terms of section 3 of 
the LEAA would have to pass a lower threshold of scrutiny than viva voce evidence.65 
The inherent unreliable nature of hearsay evidence, coupled with the caution of 
admitting the evidence of an accomplice66 warranted such evidence to be excluded 
                                        
59  This position has been cited with approval in the case of S v Ralukukwe 2006 2 SACR 394 (SCA) 
(hereinafter referred to as "Ralukukwe").  
60  Ndhlovu trial court paras 48-49. 
61  Litako para 51. 
62  Litako para 54.  
63  Litako para 54. 
64  Balkwell v S 2007 3 All SA 465 (SCA) paras 32-35, hereinafter referred to as "Balkwell". 
65  Litako para 46. 
66  Litako paras 46, 65. 
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because it had the effect of infringing the accused's right to a fair trial.67By invoking a 
teleological or value laden approach to interpretation68, the court concluded that the 
constitutional values which underpin the criminal justice system have as their objective 
a fair trial for accused persons and this demands that the extra curial statement of an 
accused be inadmissible against a co-accused. In other words, constitutionally 
measured, it would not be in the interests of justice to allow such admission. 
The court's next line of attack against Ndhlovu is found in its brief analysis of the text 
of section 3 of the LEAA, in which it draws attention to the fact that the provision is 
prefaced with the words, "Subject to the provisions of any other law…" By using certain 
common law cannons of construction, the court concludes that this implies that section 
3 does not expressly override the common law but is actually subject to the common 
law.69 If the intention of the legislature had been to alter the common law, such an 
intention would have had to be made express in the legislation. Failing this, the statute 
must be interpreted in conformity with the common law rather than against it. 
Thirdly, the court then decided that given the inadmissibility of the statement, all 
convictions and sentences could not stand.70 Despite the statement's being admissible 
against its maker, i.e. the first accused, it could not on its own found a conviction 
against this accused on the charges against him. This was due to the unreliable nature 
of the other forms of evidence tendered by the prosecution. 
While perhaps intuitively the best normative outcome was reached by the court, it is 
useful to examine whether the court was correct in its analysis of the relationship 
between the statute (CPA and LEAA) and the common law. An analysis of the court's 
approach to statutory interpretation is thus required. 
  
                                        
67  Litako para 6. 
68  See further Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes 247. 
69  Litako para 52. 
70  Litako para 68.  
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3.2.2 Methods of statutory interpretation analysed 
This part of the case note will examine two aspects of statutory interpretation which 
arose out of the Litako decision. The first aspect relates to the use of cannons of 
construction. It is argued that upon proper application of these rules, the correct 
outcome was reached by the court. The second aspect raised is in relation to the 
teleological method of statutory interpretation employed by the court, which is an 
application of section 39(2) of the Constitution. With respect to this aspect, it is argued 
that the court's reasoning is not "unduly strained" and is in balance with the meaning 
of the text and the constitutional imperative.  
3.2.2.1 The use of cannons of construction 
Cannons of construction are the rules and presumptions of statutory interpretation 
traced to Roman-Dutch and English law.71 Cannons cannot be used to reach the sole 
answer to an interpretative dilemma.72 They are merely means to justify, explain and 
lend legitimacy to an outcome, when the language of a provision is not clear.73 Du 
Plessis has argued that these cannons have not lost their interpretative function in the 
constitutional dispensation and can still be used to guide constitutional interpretation 
in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution.74 These cannons were mentioned very 
briefly by the court in a paragraph.75 Further examination of these cannons could be 
used to bolster the decision reached by the court. 
For instance, an applicable presumption which could have been invoked by the court 
is 
... [w]here an Act is capable of two interpretations, that one should be preferred 
which does not take away existing rights, unless it is plain that such was the intention 
of the Legislature.76 
                                        
71  Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes 122-123. 
72  Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes 126. 
73  Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes 126, 149. 
74  Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes 153. 
75  Litako para 52. 
76  Per Solomon JA in Tvl Investment Co Ltd v Springs Municipality 1922 AD 337, 347. 
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It is clear and has been explained above that section 219A of the CPA is capable of 
two interpretations. Indeed the court in Ralukukwe77 and the trial court in Ndhlovu78 
have both interpreted the provision to not constitute a prohibition on the use of an 
informal admission against a co-accused. The trial court in Ndhlovu went on further 
to state that this meant that the common law rule could be overruled by section 3 of 
the LEAA.79 By application of the presumption, it would mean that section 219A should 
be interpreted so as to not take away existing rights and this would imply that it 
prohibits the use of informal admissions tendered against a co-accused. This 
presumption is clearly in conformity with constitutional values and complies with 
section 39(2). 
Another applicable presumption which could have been invoked by the court is the 
maxim semper in dubiis benigniora praeferenda sunt, which means that "in cases of 
doubt the most beneficial interpretation is to be preferred".80 This presumption is in 
keeping with constitutional values and the directive of section 39(2). 
The court, however, applied the presumption referred to in the case of Casserly v 
Stubbs,81where it was held that 
... [w]e cannot infer that a statute intends to alter the common law. The statute must 
either explicitly say that it is the intention of the legislature to alter the common law, 
or the inference from the Ordinance must be such that we can come to no other 
conclusion than that the legislature did have such an intention. 
Furthermore, the court found that it was a sound rule to construe a statute in 
conformity with the common law rather than against it, except where it is clear that 
the statute intends to alter the common law.82 These cannons do not make mention 
of the protection of existing rights and it is submitted that it could in its application be 
incompatible with section 39(2). The court would have done better if it had referred 
to cannons which are in clear conformity with section 39(2). 
                                        
77  Ralukukwe para 10. 
78  Ndhlovu trial court paras 48-49. 
79  Ndhlovu trial court paras 48-49. 
80  Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes 161. 
81  Casserly v Stubbs 1916 TPD 310 312. 
82  Litako para 52, where the court referred to the case of Johannesburg Municipality v Cohen's 
Trustees 1909 TS 811 823. 
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The application of section 39(2) is explained below. 
3.2.2.2 Application of section 39(2) 
In terms of section 39(2), every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when interpreting any legislation and when 
developing the common law. All statutes must be interpreted through "the prism of 
the Bill of Rights".83 The "most constitutional" interpretation of a provision is preferred 
over any other interpretation, whether constitutionally compatible or not.84  
According to Bishop and Brickhill, section 39(2) is "an explicit response to the overtly 
literalist approach to interpretation" of the apartheid era judiciary.85 The case of 
Hyundai86 provides a guide as to how section 39(2) should be applied. In that case 
the court said that: 
… judicial officers must prefer interpretations of legislation that fall within 
constitutional bounds over those that do not, provided that such an interpretation 
can be reasonably ascribed to the section.87  
There are limits to this application and the interpretation must not be "unduly 
strained";88 in other words, the formulation of the provision must be capable of such 
an interpretation. The provision thus requires a liberal and rights-affirming approach 
to interpretation which should, at the same time, be mindful of the text and exercised 
appropriately with restraint. 
Indeed, the Constitution demands a purposive approach to interpretation.89 This 
approach requires interpreting a statute in the light of its context i.e. its scope, purpose 
and background.90 According to Du Plessis, purposive interpretation is teleological 
interpretation,91 which is in turn a form of interpretation informed by the values of the 
                                        
83  Hyundai para 21. 
84  Bishop and Brickhill 2012 SALJ 685. 
85  Bishop and Brickhill 2012 SALJ 683. 
86  Hyundai.  
87  Hyundai para 23.  
88  Hyundai para 24. 
89  Bertie Van Zyl (Pty) Ltd v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 2 SA 181 (CC) para 21. 
90  Jaga v Dönges; Bhana v Dönges 1950 4 SA 653 (A) 662G-H. 
91  Du Plessis 1998 Acta Juridica 15. 
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legal order i.e constitutional values.92Thus it can be deduced that section 39(2) 
requires a teleological approach to statutory interpretation.  
Despite not specifically referring to section 39(2) or to teleological (or purposive) 
interpretation, the court in Litako effectively applied this approach with the restraint 
required. The court chose to interpret section 219A in a manner which promoted the 
rights of accused persons, rather than choosing an interpretation which denied these 
rights. This approach was appropriate because the text of section 219A (CPA) and 
section 3 (LEAA) allowed for such an interpretation to not be "unduly strained." Thus 
despite not explicitly referring to the constitutional mandate of section 39(2) the court 
gave effect to it, and it is for this reason that the judgment is sound. 
4 Conclusion 
The judgment has been positively received within the attorney's profession. In a recent 
publication of a South African attorney's journal, it was hailed as being of "seminal 
importance" since it cleared up the "confusion and uncertainty" created by Ndhlovu.93 
Furthermore, it was felt that the judgment should be lauded because it recognised 
that an admission could be as incriminatory as a confession and that the right of an 
accused to adduce and challenge evidence is integral to his right to a fair trial.94 
It is not known at this point whether the matter will be appealed to the Constitutional 
Court. From a constitutional perspective the judgment appears to be sound, as due 
consideration is given to interpreting the statutory provisions within the prism of the 
Bill of Rights. The judgment may be the impetus required to drive the legislature to 
finally remove the statutory distinctions between confessions and their "poor 
relations",95 informal admissions. 
How will this judgment affect the future prosecution of crimes? The court in Litako 
dryly commented that post Ndhlovu, prosecutors have tried to categorise extra curial 
                                        
92  Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes 247. 
93  Olsen 2014 De Rebus 42. 
94  Olsen 2014 De Rebus 43.  
95  Olsen 2014 De Rebus 43. 
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statements made by co-accused as admissions, and defence counsel have sought to 
have such statements categorised as confessions.96 Perhaps the judgment may lay 
this perversity to rest.  
                                        
96  Litako para 58. 
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